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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Survey covers the period from June 1, 2018–May 31, 2019.1 The
Article discusses attorney discipline, ineffective assistance of counsel,
bar admission, judicial ethics, malpractice, several miscellaneous cases
involving legal ethics, and actions of the Formal Advisory Opinion
Board.
II. LAWYER DISCIPLINE2
A.

Disbarments3
1.

Trust Account and Other Financial Issues

The Georgia Supreme Court disbarred four attorneys during the
survey period for misconduct that primarily related to their trust
accounts or other financial issues.
*William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Mercer University School of Law. Washington University (A.B., 1979); University of
Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983). Member, State Bars of Georgia
and Texas.
1. For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics during the June 1, 2017 to May 31, 2018
survey period, see Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
70 MERCER L. REV. 141 (2018).
2. In addition to the matters recited in the text, the State Disciplinary Board
imposed confidential discipline in the form of Letters of Formal Admonition in sixteen
cases and Confidential Reprimands in fifteen cases between May 1, 2018 and April 30,
2019 (a slightly different time period than this survey). See Melody A. Glouton, State
Disciplinary Board, 2019 REP. OF THE OFF. OF GEN. COUNS. OF THE ST. B. OF GA. at 6.
(https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/19_OGC_Report.pdf).
The State Disciplinary Board also dismissed 26 cases with Letters of Instruction. Id.
3. Lawyers in Georgia can submit petitions for voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-227 (2019). The acceptance of a petition for voluntary discipline of
disbarment (sometimes described as a voluntary surrender of the lawyer’s license) is
tantamount to disbarment by the court and is treated as such in this Article.
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Anthony Eugene Cheatham was already suspended from the practice
of law for failure to complete his continuing legal education
requirements when he agreed to close a real estate transaction. 4 Mr.
Cheatham received $140,600 as the purchase money and $1,000 in
earnest money, but instead of disbursing the proceeds of the sale to the
seller, Mr. Cheatham converted all the funds to his own use. After he
closed the sale, Mr. Cheatham made some partial payments and misled
the seller and the purchasers about the reasons why he did so. 5 Mr.
Cheatham also “failed to timely prepare and record the warranty
deed . . .; failed to communicate with the seller and purchasers
regarding the deed; failed to account for the proceeds of the sale . . .;
and abandoned the completion of the sale to the detriment of the seller
and purchasers.”6 Mr. Cheatham defaulted in the disciplinary process,
and the supreme court disbarred him.7
George W. Snipes lost his license because he settled a client’s case
without permission, converted most of the settlement funds, and
defaulted in the disciplinary process. 8 After Mr. Snipes settled the case
for $300,000, the insurance company sent the settlement checks to his
client who, on Mr. Snipes’s instruction, endorsed the checks and sent
them to Mr. Snipes. Mr. Snipes sent the client $170,000 and promised
to pay the client’s outstanding medical bills and pay himself his
attorney’s fees from the remaining funds, but instead Mr. Snipes
converted all of the remaining money for himself.9
Richard Allen Hunt was disbarred for removing client funds from a
trust account and using them for personal and business expenses. 10 Mr.
Hunt took possession of approximately $60,000 that belonged to a
client’s two sons and then, according to his own testimony, withdrew
the money from his trust account gradually and used it to fund a
personal injury case he had filed, making a bet that the case would
settle before he needed to repay the funds.11 Mr. Hunt lost that bet.12
The supreme court noted that the presumptive sanction for such
intentional, harmful criminal conduct was disbarment.13 There were

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

In re Cheatham, 304 Ga. 645, 645, 820 S.E.2d 668, 669–70 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 645–46, 820 S.E.2d at 670.
Id. at 645–47, 820 S.E.2d at 669–70.
In re Snipes, 303 Ga. 800, 800–01, 815 S.E.2d 54, 54–55 (2018).
Id. at 801, 815 S.E.2d at 55.
In re Hunt, 304 Ga. 635, 635–44, 820 S.E.2d 716, 716–23 (2018).
Id. at 637, 639–40, 820 S.E.2d at 718, 719–20.
Id. at 640 n.8, 820 S.E.2d at 720 n.8.
Id. at 641, 820 S.E.2d at 720.
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numerous aggravating factors in the case, including a long prior
disciplinary history, intentional misconduct, multiple violations
(including numerous withdrawals of the money and lying to the client
about what he was going to do with it), selfish and dishonest motive,
failure to make restitution until compelled to do so, refusal to
acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, lack of remorse,
vulnerability of the victims, and substantial experience in the practice
of law.14 The special master rejected Mr. Hunt’s arguments that there
were mitigating circumstances, and the supreme court agreed that Mr.
Hunt should be disbarred.15
The supreme court rejected the special master’s recommendation of a
four-year suspension and disbarred Gary Lanier Coulter.16 Mr. Coulter
“administered very large sums of client-money for years, over $1 million
in 2011 alone, using 12 different bank accounts, none of which were
trust accounts . . . .”17 He failed to keep accurate records of the funds
and did not accurately account for money that was transferred from
these accounts to his operating accounts, ostensibly as payment of
hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney’s fees. 18 The special master
found that there were three mitigating factors—remorse, good
reputation, and interim rehabilitation—but the special master also
found in aggravation that Mr. Coulter had substantial experience in the
practice of law, a prior disciplinary history, and a dishonest or selfish
motive. The special master also found that Mr. Coulter’s conduct
included multiple violations of the rules.19 The supreme court concluded
that disbarment was appropriate because of “the serious nature of the
violations at issue here, the number of aggravating factors, including
Coulter’s prior disciplinary history,” and because “the record facts
demonstrate that Coulter did intend to violate the trust account
rules.”20

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 642–43, 820 S.E.2d at 721–22.
Id. at 643–44, 820 S.E.2d at 722–23.
In re Coulter, 304 Ga. 81, 85, 816 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2018).
Id. at 83, 816 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 82–83, 816 S.E.2d at 2.
Id. at 85, 816 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 85, 816 S.E.2d at 4.
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Client Abandonment or Lack of Communication

The supreme court disbarred three attorneys for misconduct that
included client abandonment or failure to communicate. 21
Jack S. Jennings lost his license because he abandoned a matter and
then engaged in a course of misconduct following abandonment. 22 Mr.
Jennings initially failed to answer requests for admission. When the
client fired Mr. Jennings and new counsel sought the file, Mr. Jennings
sent a partial file that omitted the evidence that Mr. Jennings had
failed to answer the requests for admission in order to conceal that fact.
Mr. Jennings did not appear at a hearing about turning over the entire
file and still refused to do so after being ordered by the court to do so
and being assessed attorney’s fees (which he refused to pay). Mr.
Jennings did not respond to the bar’s formal complaint.23 The supreme
court considered aggravating factors, including intentionally concealing
the misconduct (to the detriment of his client), ignoring the trial court’s
order to pay attorney’s fees, substantial experience in the practice of
law, multiple rule violations, failure to cooperate in the disciplinary
process, refusal to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct, and
indifference to making restitution.24
Shannon Briley-Holmes was disbarred for misconduct in connection
with the representation of eleven clients.25 Her misconduct included
client abandonment in seven cases (violations of Rule 1.3),26 failure to
communicate in three cases (violations of Rule 1.4),27 failure to refund
unearned fees and/or failure to forward a client’s file to a new attorney
(violations of Rule 1.16),28 and filing a civil suit against a client without
a valid factual basis (violation of Rule 3.1).29 The special master
recommended a five-year suspension, but the supreme court noted that
it had never imposed such a long suspension other than for reciprocal
discipline.30 Although Ms. Briley-Holmes had presented evidence of
personal or emotional problems, efforts to make restitution (in one
21. See In re Larson, 305 Ga. 522, 826 S.E.2d 99 (2019); In re Jennings, 305 Ga. 133,
823 S.E.2d 811 (2019); In re Briley-Holmes, 304 Ga. 199, 815 S.E.2d 59 (2018).
22. In re Jennings, 305 Ga. 133, 823 S.E.2d 811 (2019).
23. Id. at 134, 823 S.E.2d at 812–13.
24. Id. at 134–35, 823 S.E.2d at 813.
25. In re Briley-Holmes, 304 Ga. 199, 815 S.E.2d 59 (2019).
26. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (2019).
27. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (2019).
28. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (2018).
29. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2018); In re Briley-Holmes, 304 Ga. at 199–
205, 208–209, 815 S.E.2d at 60–63, 65.
30. In re Briley-Holmes, 304 Ga. at 207, 815 S.E.2d at 65.
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case), inexperience in the practice of law, and cooperation (in six of the
eleven cases), the court determined that she should be disbarred,
because she knowingly engaged in a pattern of misconduct that caused
serious injury to vulnerable clients and displayed indifference to
making restitution to all but one of the clients. 31
The supreme court disbarred Neil Larson after he defaulted with
respect to four notices of discipline. 32 Mr. Larson had accepted payment
in advance to represent four criminal defendants and abandoned all
four. He also had made misrepresentations to one client’s family about
the status of the matter. There were no mitigating factors, and the
aggravating factors included a dishonest motive in collecting fees and
then abandoning the clients, substantial experience in the practice of
law, multiple offenses, and a prior disciplinary history.33
3.

Criminal Activity

Three Georgia lawyers lost their licenses during the survey period as
a result of criminal conduct.34
The supreme court accepted Shannon DeWayne Patterson’s petition
for voluntary surrender of his license after he pled guilty in federal
court to one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation and
presentation of a false tax return.35 The supreme court accepted the
voluntary surrender of the license of Richard Scott Thompson after he
was convicted of the felony of aggravated stalking.36 David P. Rachel
was disbarred following the exhaustion of his appeals from conviction in
federal court for conspiracy and money laundering.37
4.

Miscellaneous Disbarment

The supreme court disbarred one attorney for reasons other than
financial misdeeds, client abandonment, or criminal activity. 38 Prince A.
Brumfield, Jr. voluntarily surrendered his license and admitted that he

31. Id. at 206–09, 815 S.E.2d at 64–66.
32. In re Larson, 305 Ga. 522, 826 S.E.2d 99 (2019).
33. Id. at 522–23, 826 S.E.2d at 99–100.
34. See In re Patterson, 305 Ga. 38, 823 S.E.2d 264 (2019); In re Thompson, 305 Ga.
888, 828 S.E.2d 294 (2019); In re Rachel, 304 Ga. 826, 822 S.E.2d 195 (2018).
35. In re Patterson, 305 Ga. at 38, 823 S.E.2d at 264.
36. In re Thompson, 305 Ga. at 888, 828 S.E.2d at 294.
37. In re Rachel, 304 Ga. at 826, 822 S.E.2d at 195.
38. See In re Brumfield, 303 Ga. 803, 815 S.E.2d 52 (2018).
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engaged in deceitful conduct by knowingly filing a deed that falsely
purported to contain the signature of an individual.39
B. Suspensions40
1.

Six-month Suspensions

The supreme court suspended two lawyers for six months. 41 Ricardo
L. Polk was suspended for six months (consecutive to a thirty-month
suspension he was already serving) for failure to return unearned fees
to a client after Mr. Polk was required to withdraw from the
representation of the client due to the suspension related to other
grievances.42 The court determined Mr. Polk’s disciplinary history was a
factor in aggravation, while mitigation evidence included a lack of
selfish or dishonest motive, remorse, cooperation with the bar, and
acknowledgement of the wrongful nature of his conduct. 43
S. Quinn Johnson received a six-month suspension because he
committed multiple violations of his duties of diligence and
communication and also failed to return unearned fees, filed pleadings
while he was suspended from practice, and violated Rule 1.15(I)44
(relating to trust accounts).45 Mr. Johnson had been the subject of prior
discipline and had substantial experience in the practice of law, but he
presented significant mitigation evidence. The mitigating factors
included personal and emotional problems at the time of the offenses,
lack of a selfish or dishonest motive, restitution, cooperation with the
bar, good reputation, and remorse. He also presented evidence that he
had taken steps of interim rehabilitation such as consulting with the
Law Practice Management Program of the state bar, continuing legal
education regarding attorney–client relations and office procedures, and
counseling for his personal problems. 46

39. In re Brumfield, 303 Ga. at 803, 815 S.E.2d at 52.
40. This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and
does not discuss interim suspensions.
41. See In re Polk, 304 Ga. 326, 818 S.E.2d 495 (2018); In re Johnson, 303 Ga. 795,
815 S.E.2d 55 (2018).
42. In re Polk, 304 Ga. at 326, 818 S.E.2d at 495.
43. Id. at 328, 818 S.E.2d at 496.
44. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(I) (2019).
45. In re Johnson, 303 Ga. at 795, 815 S.E.2d at 55.
46. Id. at 798–99, 815 S.E.2d at 58.
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Suspensions Longer Than Six Months

The supreme court suspended five lawyers for longer than six
months during the survey period.47
The supreme court accepted the fourth voluntary petition for
discipline from Samuel Williams, who had pled guilty to a felony charge
for selling unregistered securities in Alabama, and suspended Mr.
Williams for twenty months, nunc pro tunc to the date he voluntarily
ceased practicing law.48 The court noted the following mitigating
circumstances that justified the suspension rather than disbarment (the
most common discipline for a felony conviction):
[Mr. Williams] was under considerable mental and emotional stress
because of the near-concurrent bankruptcy of his law firm and
diagnosis of his wife with metastatic breast cancer in the fall of 2009;
that he has no prior disciplinary history or criminal record; that he
served honorably in the military for 20 years; that he self-reported
his conviction to the disciplinary authorities and has been
cooperative; that his failure to register the securities was negligent
and unintentional; that his failure to reject or secure the $380,000
was negligent and without a selfish motive; that he is sincerely
remorseful; that he has attempted to improve his own understanding
of the law and to help others avoid the mistakes he made; and that
he has complied with all of the terms of his probation. Williams also
asserts that the nearly four-year delay between his self-reporting of
the violation and the petition for appointment of a special master
should be considered in mitigation. Additionally, the Alabama
prosecutor sent a letter to the Bar saying that Williams was
inexperienced, distressed because of his wife’s illness, and extremely
remorseful, and that the trial judge concluded that Williams’s
involvement in the criminal scheme was minimal.49

The court noted that generally a lawyer will not be reinstated while
the lawyer is on probation for a crime because that would undermine
respect for the legal system.50 In Mr. Williams’s case, however, the only
thing that kept him subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court in
Alabama was his ongoing restitution obligation. 51 The supreme court

47. See In re Williams, 304 Ga. 832, 822 S.E.2d 827 (2019); In re Saunders, 304 Ga.
824, 822 S.E.2d 235 (2018); In re Barnes, 304 Ga. 324, 818 S.E.2d 497 (2018); In re
Podvin, 304 Ga. 378, 818 S.E.2d 651 (2018); In re Dale, 304 Ga. 446, 819 S.E.2d 5 (2018).
48. In re Williams, 304 Ga. at 833, 822 S.E.2d at 827–28.
49. Id. at 833–34, 822 S.E.2d at 828.
50. Id. at 835 n.4, 822 S.E.2d at 829 n.4.
51. Id. at 834–35, 822 S.E.2d at 828–29.
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decided that suspension was appropriate given that it was likely that
Mr. Williams would never be able to make full restitution and therefore
waiting for that condition to be fulfilled and for complete release from
the jurisdiction of the Alabama court would result, in effect, with an
“endless suspension.”52
The court also accepted a voluntary petition for discipline in the form
of a twelve-month suspension from Amber Cecile Saunders. 53 Ms.
Saunders converted over $26,000 in client funds to her own use at a
time when she was suffering extreme emotional distress and financial
difficulties stemming from being the victim of domestic violence. 54 The
supreme court imposed a twelve-month suspension in light of the
circumstances and other mitigating factors, including full restitution to
the client, cooperation with the disciplinary process, good character,
and remorse.55 The court rejected the suggestion that Ms. Saunders’s
inexperience in the practice of law should be a mitigating factor, noting
that “even a first-year law student should understand that conversion
of client funds for personal use is impermissible.” 56
The supreme court accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and
suspended Nathaniel Antonio Barnes, Jr. for twenty-one months after
he pled guilty to felony possession of cocaine and misdemeanor
disorderly conduct.57 Mr. Barnes was found walking around the
common area of his condominium complex in his underwear and
holding a knife, in the midst of a delusional episode caused by three
days of cocaine use and lack of sleep. Although conviction of a felony
often results in disbarment, Mr. Barnes presented significant
mitigating evidence: lack of a prior disciplinary record or dishonest
motive, depression, addiction, acceptance of responsibility, cooperation
with the bar, good professional reputation, and remorse. 58 The court
issued a slightly longer suspension than an otherwise similarly-situated
lawyer received because of the knife that Mr. Barnes was wielding
during the episode that led to his arrest. 59 Mr. Barnes entered a drug
court program, upon completion of which the prosecution would dismiss

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 835, 822 S.E.2d at 829.
In re Saunders, 304 Ga. at 824, 822 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 824–25, 822 S.E.2d at 236.
Id. at 825, S.E.2d at 236–37.
Id. at 825 n.2, 822 S.E.2d at 236 n.2.
In re Barnes, 304 Ga. at 324, 818 S.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 324–25, 818 S.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 325, 818 S.E.2d at 499.
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the charges, and Mr. Barnes’s reinstatement was conditioned upon
successful completion of the drug court program.60
Scott L. Podvin was suspended for eighteen months as reciprocal
discipline.61 Mr. Podvin had been suspended in Florida for misconduct
in connection with lack of diligence, failure to communicate with clients,
submission of “an agreed order” to a court that in fact had not been
agreed upon, and ex parte communications with a court.62
Matthew Thomas Dale successfully petitioned for voluntary
discipline in the form of an eighteen-month suspension.63 Mr. Dale pled
guilty to the felony of being a Peeping Tom and was sentenced as a first
offender to four years of probation. Mr. Dale’s offense was mitigated by
lack of prior discipline, evidence of personal and emotional problems at
the time, cooperation in the disciplinary process, remorse, good
character, acknowledgement of the nature of his wrongdoing, and the
lack of any relationship between his conduct and the practice of law. 64
C. Public Reprimands
The supreme court ordered two public reprimands during the survey
period.65
The court imposed a public reprimand on Heather E. Jordan, a
relatively inexperienced lawyer who had no prior disciplinary record. 66
Ms. Jordan failed to communicate with a client about a matter, did not
do the necessary work, provided incorrect responses in discovery, and
eventually stopped working on the case and communicating with the
client entirely. The client obtained another attorney, but Ms. Jordan
initially did not send the file to her successor. 67 The supreme court
determined that Ms. Jordan had violated her duties of consultation
with the client (Rule 1.2),68 diligence (Rule 1.3), communication
(Rule 1.4), and duties upon withdrawal (Rule 1.16).69
The supreme court also accepted a petition for voluntary discipline in
the form of a public reprimand to resolve two disciplinary matters

60. Id. at 326, 818 S.E.2d at 499.
61. In re Podvin, 304 Ga. at 378, 818 S.E.2d at 651.
62. Id. at 379, 818 S.E.2d at 652.
63. In re Dale, 304 Ga. at 447, 819 S.E.2d at 6.
64. Id. at 446–47, 819 S.E.2d at 6.
65. See In re Jordan, 305 Ga. 35, 823 S.E.2d 257 (2019); In re Cherry, 305 Ga. 667,
827 S.E.2d 239 (2019).
66. In re Jordan, 305 Ga. at 35, 823 S.E.2d at 257.
67. Id. at 35–36, 823 S.E.2d at 257–58.
68. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (2018).
69. In re Jordan, 305 Ga. at 36, 823 S.E.2d at 258.
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involving Melody Yvonne Cherry.70 One of the matters involved her
violation of Rule 1.15 (I)(b)71 by disbursing settlement funds to a client
without satisfying the bill of a chiropractor who had provided services
to the client based upon Ms. Cherry’s representation that the bill would
be paid from the settlement. In the other matter, Ms. Cherry was
contacted by a prospective client in connection with an automobile
accident. Even though the prospective client did not hire her, Ms.
Cherry sent a letter to the other driver’s insurance company supposedly
from the prospective client. The letter falsely purported to have the
prospective client’s signature on it, and Ms. Cherry’s employee
notarized the forged signature at Ms. Cherry’s direction. 72 The supreme
court took note of mitigating circumstances but denied the earlier
petition because Ms. Cherry did not demonstrate that she had satisfied
the chiropractor’s outstanding bill.73 The court accepted the second
petition when Ms. Cherry provided evidence that she had done so. 74
D. Review Board Reprimands
The supreme court accepted a voluntary petition for discipline in the
form of a review board reprimand from Lakeisha Tennille Gantt. 75 Ms.
Gantt accepted a fee to represent a client in connection with an
adoption. Ms. Gantt then neglected to complete the necessary
paperwork over the ensuing three years, and during that time she
failed to communicate with the client as required by Rule 1.4.76 The
supreme court accepted the voluntary petition, despite the fact that Ms.
Gantt had been disciplined before, in light of mitigating factors. 77 The
mitigation included that Ms. Gantt had experienced personal and
emotional problems that required treatment and counseling during the
relevant time period. Ms. Gantt also apologized to the client, offered to
refund the fee, lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and cooperated with
the disciplinary process.78

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

In re Cherry, 305 Ga. at 667, 827 S.E.2d at 239.
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.15(I) (2019).
In re Cherry, 305 Ga. at 668–69, 827 S.E.2d at 240.
In re Cherry, 304 Ga. 836, 840, 822 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2019).
In re Cherry, 305 Ga. at 670–71, 827 S.E.2d at 241.
In re Gantt, 305 Ga. 722, 827 S.E.2d 683 (2019).
Id. at 722–23, 827 S.E.2d at 684.
Id.
Id. at 723, 827 S.E.2d at 684.
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E. Petition for Reinstatement Rejected
The supreme court accepted the recommendation of the state
disciplinary review board and rejected a suspended attorney’s petition
for reinstatement.79 The court suspended Alvis Melvin Moore in 2016
and imposed as a condition of reinstatement that Mr. Moore had to
provide a “detailed, written evaluation by a licensed psychologist or
psychiatrist that Moore was mentally competent to practice law . . . .”80
The review board found that the attorney’s petition for reinstatement
should be rejected because the lawyer’s psychological evaluation
[D]id not address Moore’s mental fitness to practice law and that the
psychologist did not describe any familiarity with the rigors and
demands of the practice of law, did not have a clear understanding of
the facts, and appeared to be unaware of the specific request from
this Court for a written evaluation certifying that Moore was
“mentally competent to practice law.”81

The supreme
reinstatement.82

court

agreed

and

rejected

the

petition

for

F. Petitions for Voluntary Discipline Rejected83
The supreme court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline in the
form of a public reprimand from Denise F. Hemmann, an attorney with
an extensive disciplinary history who sought to resolve charges that she
abandoned and failed to communicate with a client and that she
withdrew from representing the client without taking steps to protect
the client’s interests.84 The court was particularly concerned about the
possibility that Ms. Hemmann’s most recent offenses involved conduct
similar to what led to the prior discipline and that the most recent
violations were a continuation of a pattern of client abandonment. 85 The
record was silent on these questions, and in the absence of such
evidence, the court declined to accept the petition.86

79. In re Moore, 305 Ga. 419, 825 S.E.2d 225 (2019).
80. Id. at 420, 825 S.E.2d at 226.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 421, 305 S.E.2d at 227.
83. In addition to the cases described in this section, as noted above the supreme
court rejected a petition for voluntary discipline from Melody Yvonne Cherry before
accepting a later one. In re Cherry, 304 Ga. 836, 822 S.E.2d 823 (2019).
84. In re Hemmann, 304 Ga. 632, 820 S.E.2d 671 (2018).
85. Id. at 635, 820 S.E.2d at 673.
86. Id.
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The court also rejected a petition from David Thomas Dorer, a lawyer
who signed a client’s name to a document and noted on the document
that he had done so with the client’s permission. 87 Mr. Dorer’s assistant
then notarized the signature. Mr. Dorer was later indicted for two
felonies, filing a false statement with a government agency and filing a
false document in court. Mr. Dorer negotiated a guilty plea to a
misdemeanor. He then sought voluntary discipline from the supreme
court for having engaged in deceitful or dishonest conduct,88 but the
court rejected the petition because it did not contain enough facts to
inform the court what actually happened and to show such a violation. 89
Mr. Dorer’s notation that he had express permission to sign his client’s
name would negate any deceit if he actually had such permission, and
the petition did not state otherwise.90 The court followed a line of
previous cases in which it rejected voluntary petitions when they
“lacked sufficient detail for us to determine that a violation actually
occurred or for us to understand the nature of the conduct amounting to
the violation.”91 Chief Justice Melton dissented and would have
accepted the petition.92
The supreme court also rejected a petition for voluntary discipline in
the form of a state disciplinary review board reprimand for William
Leslie Kirby III, who had neglected four matters for clients, failed to
communicate with them, did not fulfill his obligations upon withdrawal,
and who had a prior disciplinary history. 93 Although Mr. Kirby
presented some mitigating evidence, including a psychologist’s report
that Mr. Kirby had been experiencing personal or emotional problems,
that report also expressed concerns regarding whether Mr. Kirby would
follow through with plans for improvement. Mr. Kirby’s petition for
voluntary discipline did not indicate that he was following the
psychologists’ recommendations. 94 Even though the state bar supported
the petition, the court rejected it because the requested sanction was
insufficient under these circumstances, given that the case included
“neglect of multiple clients over a period of several years, a prior

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

In re Dorer, 304 Ga. 442, 442, 819 S.E.2d 7, 8 (2018).
Id.
Id. at 444–45, 819 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 444, 819 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 444–45, 819 S.E.2d at 9.
Id. at 445–46, 819 S.E.2d at 10 (Melton, C.J., dissenting).
In re Kirby, 304 Ga. 628, 628, 820 S.E.2d 729, 729 (2018).
Id. at 630, 820 S.E.2d at 731.
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disciplinary history, and questions about the lawyer’s ongoing ability to
comply with his professional obligations . . . .”95
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. A Case in Which a Claim of Ineffective Assistance Succeeded
In Mims v. State,96 the defendant was convicted of malice murder and
other crimes connected to an armed robbery and also of theft of a
vehicle that had been stolen a month earlier in Michigan.97 The
supreme court rejected several claims of ineffective assistance but held
that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not seeking to
sever the trial of theft charges from the other charges. 98 Trial counsel’s
failure to move to sever was deficient performance because the joinder
of multiple charges is appropriate only when the offenses “‘(a) are of the
same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or
(b) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected
together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.’” 99 The theft
charge and the charges relating to the murder bore no such
relationships. The harder issues involved whether the defendant
suffered any prejudice from the joinder of the charges.100 The court
determined that there was no prejudice as to the murder charge
because there was overwhelming evidence of guilt. 101 With respect to
the theft charge, the court held that there was prejudice because the
evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and because evidence of the
defendant’s “participation in a gruesome murder was very prejudicial to
the jury’s consideration of the theft offense.”102 The court reversed the
theft conviction.103
B. Cases in Which Orders Finding Ineffective Assistance Were Reversed
or Vacated
The supreme court reversed two murder cases in which trial courts
had ordered new trials based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; in
95. Id. at 632, 820 S.E.2d at 732.
96. 304 Ga. 851, 823 S.E.2d 325 (2019).
97. Id. at 851, 823 S.E.2d at 328–29.
98. Id. at 854–60, 823 S.E.2d at 331–35.
99. Id. at 857, 823 S.E.2d at 333 (quoting Harrell v. State, 297 Ga. 884, 889, 778
S.E.2d 196, 201 (2015)).
100. Id. at 857–58, 823 S.E.2d at 333.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 858, 823 S.E.2d at 333.
103. Id.
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another case, it vacated an order granting a new trial to the defendant
and remanded the case for further findings.104
In State v. Spratlin,105 the supreme court reversed a trial court’s
findings that trial counsel in a murder case had rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel.106 The prosecution had offered three witnesses
who testified about the defendant’s pretrial silence, and defendant’s
trial counsel did not object to any of the testimony. Also, the prosecutor
referred in closing argument to the defendant’s silence and the
defendant’s failure to make a statement to the police. The defendant’s
trial counsel objected to that argument and asked for a mistrial. 107 The
trial judge sustained the objection but, instead of ordering a mistrial,
gave the jury a curative instruction.108 In granting a motion for new
trial, the trial court found that there was no ineffective assistance with
respect to the failure to object to the first witness but that the failure to
object to the testimony of the other two, and to prevent the improper
closing argument, was ineffective assistance that warranted a new
trial.109
The supreme court reversed.110 The court noted that the failure to
object to the first witness was not an issue on appeal. 111 As to the
second witness, the court determined that it concerned testimony about
a colloquy between the defendant and an arresting officer “post-arrest,
pre-Miranda warnings, without interrogation or an affirmative
invocation of the right to silence . . . offered in the State’s case rather
than only for impeachment.”112 The court concluded that the question
whether such testimony was constitutionally prohibited was not settled,
and therefore a failure to object could not be ineffective assistance. 113
With respect to the third witness, the court held that the testimony was
clearly objectionable, but that it would have been a reasonable trial
strategy not to object to it in order not to call attention to it and in order
to avoid the exclusion of other testimony—theoretically helpful to the

104. See State v. Spratlin, 305 Ga. 585, 826 S.E.2d 36 (2019); State v. Tedder, 305 Ga.
577, 826 S.E.2d 30 (2019); Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 820 S.E. 2d 50 (2018).
105. 305 Ga. 585, 826 S.E.2d 36 (2019).
106. Id. at 585, 826 S.E.2d at 38.
107. Id. at 587–88, 826 S.E.2d at 39–40.
108. Id. at 588–89, 826 S.E.2d at 40.
109. Id. at 590–91, 826 S.E.2d at 41.
110. Id. at 585, 826 S.E.2d at 38.
111. Id. at 590, 826 S.E.2d at 41.
112. Id. at 593, 826 S.E.2d at 43.
113. Id.
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defendant—given as part of the same exchange with the prosecutor.114
The failure to object, therefore, was not deficient performance. 115
The supreme court did determine that the defendant’s trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by not raising an objection before closing
arguments to references to the defendant’s silence and by not objecting
immediately when the prosecutor made such references. 116 The court
also found, however, that there was no reasonable probability that the
result of the trial would have been different if defendant’s trial counsel
had made timely objections.117 The court characterized the references in
closing argument to the defendant’s silence as “cumulative” because the
jury had already heard the testimony.118 In deciding that the defendant
suffered no prejudice from the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel,
the supreme court also noted that the trial judge gave a curative
instruction and that the evidence against the defendant was “not
weak.”119
In State v. Tedder,120 the supreme court reversed a trial court’s grant
of a new trial to a murder defendant based upon ineffective assistance
of counsel.121 The victim died from a gunshot wound to the back of his
head that he suffered in a shootout between people in a car and people
outside the car. The victim was in the front seat of the car at the time of
the shooting, and the defendant was seated directly behind him. 122 The
state’s theory was that the defendant shot the victim in the car. 123 The
theory of the defense was that another passenger in the car fired the
fatal shot. The defendant was convicted.124
The defendant filed a motion for new trial and claimed that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did
not call a crime scene expert to testify. At the hearing on the motion for
new trial, the defendant presented evidence from such an expert that,
in light of several pieces of physical evidence (including the victim’s
wounds and the blood splatter inside the car), the crime could have not
occurred as theorized by the state, but instead the fatal shot must have

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 593–94, 826 S.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 594, 826 S.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 594, 826 S.E.2d at 43–44.
Id. at 594–97, 826 S.E.2d at 44–45.
Id. at 595, 826 S.E.2d at 44.
Id.
305 Ga. 577, 826 S.E.2d 30 (2019).
Id. at 577, 826 S.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 578, 826 S.E.2d at 32.
Id. at 581, 826 S.E.2d at 34.
Id.
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come from outside the car.125 Trial counsel represented to the court that
it never occurred to him to consider calling a crime scene expert. The
trial court found this to be deficient performance and found that this
conduct was not reasonable.126
The supreme court reversed and added this to a line of cases in which
it has held that it will assess the reasonableness of trial counsel’s
strategic “conduct” regardless of whether the attorney actually made
any decision at all.127 Here, the lawyer did not make a strategic decision
not to call a crime scene expert; as noted, it never occurred to the
lawyer to do so.128 Nevertheless, the court held that counsel’s choice to
argue that another passenger shot the victim “was not so unreasonable
that no competent attorney would have pursued that strategy. Trial
counsel could reasonably have made that decision even if he had known
at the time of trial that expert testimony was available pointing to the
fatal shot coming from outside [the] vehicle.”129
In Gramiak v. Beasley,130 the supreme court vacated an order
granting relief on habeas corpus for ineffective assistance of both trial
and appellate counsel.131 The supreme court found that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient when counsel failed to advise the defendant
that, if the defendant rejected a plea offer and was convicted of
kidnapping with bodily injury, the defendant faced a mandatory life
sentence.132 The court remanded the case, however, for factual
determinations regarding whether the defendant would have accepted
the plea if he had been properly advised, whether the trial court would
have accepted the plea arrangement, and, if those conditions were
satisfied, whether the defendant’s appellate counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not raising on direct appeal the trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness with respect to the plea advice. 133 The supreme court
also instructed the habeas court to consider the proper remedy if it
found that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective.134

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 582–83, 826 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 583, 826 S.E.2d at 35.
Id.
Id.
304 Ga. 512, 820 S.E.2d 50 (2018).
Id. at 523–24, 820 S.E.2d at 60.
Id. at 514, 820 S.E.2d at 54.
Id. at 514–24, 820 S.E.2d at 54–60.
Id. at 524, 820 S.E.2d at 60.
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C. One Miscellaneous Ineffective Assistance Case
In Chamberlain v. State,135 the defendant was convicted of molesting
his ten-year-old niece. There was no physical evidence and no
eyewitness to the molestation other than the alleged victim. 136 The jury
was allowed to see a recorded forensic interview in which the victim
described her uncle’s actions.137 The defense did not call an expert on
forensic interviewing in an attempt to undermine the credibility of the
evidence the child gave to the interviewer. On a motion for new trial,
the defendant unsuccessfully claimed that this failure to call an expert
witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 138 The court of
appeals affirmed, determining that the failure to call the expert was a
matter of trial strategy.139
Judge McFadden dissented.140 He noted that the defendant had
produced an expert at the hearing on the motion for new trial, and the
expert testified about numerous deficiencies in the victim’s forensic
interview about which the expert could have testified. 141 Judge
McFadden noted that defense counsel did not even consider whether to
call an expert in forensic interviewing for the purpose of undermining
the credibility of the recorded interview (as opposed to using one to
dispute the admissibility of the recording), and therefore, Judge
McFadden characterized the failure to call an expert as a result of a
failure to investigate rather than trial strategy.142 The dissent
concluded that counsel’s conduct was unreasonable and that there was
a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been acquitted
if the expert had been called, given the lack of evidence other than the
evidence that came from the alleged victim. 143

135. 347 Ga. App. 775, 819 S.E.2d 303 (2018).
136. Id. at 789, 819 S.E.2d at 315 (McFadden, P.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 776, 819 S.E.2d at 307 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 781, 819 S.E.2d at 309.
139. Id. at 781, 819 S.E.2d at 309–10.
140. Id. at 786–90, 819 S.E.2d at 312–15 (McFadden, P.J., dissenting). Because Judge
McFadden dissented, the opinion is physical precedent only. Id. at 786, 819 S.E.2d at 312.
141. Id. at 788–89, 819 S.E.2d at 314 (McFadden, P.J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 787–89, 819 S.E.2d at 313–14 (McFadden, P.J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 786, 819 S.E.2d at 312 (McFadden, P.J., dissenting).
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IV. BAR ADMISSION
The supreme court decided four cases related to bar admission
during the survey period.144
The court upheld the decision of the board to determine fitness of bar
applicants to deny LaJuan Miguel Certion a certificate of fitness. 145 The
applicant had been arrested for assault and false imprisonment in
connection with an incident in which the victim claimed he grabbed her,
threw her down, punched her, dragged her by the hair, and choked
her.146 Mr. Certion’s fitness application contained none of these details
but rather stated that he and the victim had a discussion about their
relationship and then engaged in “play wrestling/fight[ing] like [they]
always did.”147 The board held an informal conference at which Mr.
Certion admitted there was “some truth” to the victim’s description but
denied many of the details, accused the victim of lying to the police, and
described the lessons he learned from the experience as the need to be
careful in choosing whom to become involved with and to “end
relationships by just walking away.” 148 After the board issued an order
tentatively denying certification, a special master held a formal hearing
at which the applicant admitted that the victim had told police the
truth about what happened and that he had not been candid at the
informal interview.149 The special master found that the applicant had
not understood the purpose and importance of the informal interview
and that he had answered questions “defensively, out of shame, not in
an attempt to deceive anyone . . . .”150 The special master found that the
applicant had demonstrated rehabilitation by his candor and
expressions of remorse at the formal hearing and by evidence of
community service and completion of a batterers’ intervention program,
and the special master recommended that the applicant be certified as
fit.151 The board rejected the special master’s findings and denied the
certificate of fitness, finding that the applicant’s “conscious decision to
make untruthful statements during the informal conference reflected
deficiencies in the honesty, trustworthiness, and judgment required for

144. See In re Certion, 305 Ga. 504, 504, 826 S.E.2d 52, 53 (2019); In re O’Neal, 304
Ga. 449, 819 S.E.2d 1 (2018); In re Montesanti, 304 Ga. 380, 380, 818 S.E.2d 585, 586
(2018); In re Harrell, 304 Ga. 663, 821 S.E.2d 344 (2018).
145. In re Certion, 305 Ga. at 504, 826 S.E.2d at 53.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 504–05, 826 S.E.2d at 53–54.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 505–06, 826 S.E.2d at 54.
151. Id. at 506, 826 S.E.2d at 54–55.
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admission to the Bar.”152 The supreme court affirmed the denial of the
fitness certification, noting that it is deferential to decisions of the
board and will uphold decisions for which there is any evidence.153
The Georgia board of bar examiners rejected a petition by Harriet
O’Neal, a military spouse who was licensed in Louisiana and who
sought a waiver of the admission requirements while her spouse was
stationed in Georgia.154 The board denied the request without
explanation.155 The supreme court described the policies that govern
military waivers and expressed concern that it is difficult to ascertain
exactly what criteria apply because the waiver policy cross-references
other requirements and standards.156 The court also noted that as a
matter of policy the applicant should receive a written statement of the
reasons for denial.157 The court vacated the denial and remanded the
matter to the board “to clearly apply the military waiver policy and
explain why O’Neal has or has not met the waiver requirements.” 158
The Georgia board to determine fitness of bar applicants denied the
application of John Anthony Montesanti for a certification of fitness,
and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.159 The applicant had
initially begun the process of seeking a character certification in Florida
but eventually abandoned that effort.160 The court found that the
applicant had engaged in “a pattern of failing to disclose relevant
information to the Board and providing inconsistent statements to both
the Board and the Florida Bar.”161 There was testimony at the formal
hearing on the application that the applicant had admitted to a law
professor that he had intentionally withheld information sought by the
Florida Bar because he did not believe that the Florida Bar was entitled
to the information.162 The court rejected an argument that it should
“accommoda[te]” his “inability to be truthful, accurate, and forthcoming
in his bar application disclosures and his professional dealings” because
the applicant had sleep apnea that caused cognitive deficits and
increased the chances of errors.163 The court stated that if he was
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 506–07, 826 S.E.2d at 55.
Id. at 507–08, 826 S.E.2d at 55–56.
In re O’Neal, 304 Ga. at 449, 819 S.E.2d at 1.
Id. at 451–52, 819 S.E.2d at 3.
Id. at 453, 819 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 453–54, 819 S.E.2d at 4.
Id. at 454, 819 S.E.2d at 5.
In re Montesanti, 304 Ga. at 380, 818 S.E.2d at 586.
Id. at 380, 818 S.E.2d at 586–87.
Id. at 381, 818 S.E.2d at 587.
Id. at 382, 818 S.E.2d at 588.
Id. at 384, 818 S.E.2d at 589.
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confused he should have sought clarification or followed the principle of
“when one is in doubt, he or she should disclose.” 164
Finally, Freddie Darnell Harrell, who had been disbarred in 1995,
applied for a certification of fitness to practice law.165 The supreme
court found that Mr. Harrell had demonstrated his rehabilitation by
clear and convincing evidence and granted the certification. 166
V. JUDICIAL CONDUCT
The supreme court decided two cases during the survey period
regarding judicial conduct, and the court of appeals decided one.167
In Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., a trial judge orally
held a lawyer in contempt and asked for submission of a proposed
written order within ten days.168 Five days later, the lawyer filed a
motion to recuse the trial judge because the judge’s rulings on the
contempt motion were wrong and because the judge employed
“‘condescending’ and ‘angry’ facial expressions and tone” in the
contempt hearing and in other unrelated cases. 169 The record showed
that the lawyer filed the motion to recuse, but there was no direct
evidence that he “presented” it to the trial judge, as required by the
uniform superior court rules.170 Two weeks later, the trial judge entered
a written order on the contempt issue and then recused himself.171 The
supreme court held that the trial judge should not have proceeded with
the contempt order until the recusal motion was decided because such
an order must be considered to be “on the merits” of a matter, even
though it did not relate to the underlying dispute between the
parties.172 However, the court found the error was harmless because the
recusal motion was insufficient on its face. 173 The majority did not find
it necessary or prudent to decide whether the recusal motion had been
properly “presented” to the trial judge, especially since the parties did

164. Id.
165. In re Harrell, 304 Ga. at 663, 821 S.E.2d at 344.
166. Id. at 664, 821 S.E.2d at 346.
167. See Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., 303 Ga. 764, 815 S.E.2d 70
(2018); In re Anderson, 304 Ga. 165, 816 S.E. 2d 676 (2018); Csehy v. State, 346 Ga. App.
747, 816 S.E.2d 833 (2018).
168. Mondy, 303 Ga. at 764, 815 S.E.2d at 72.
169. Id. at 765, 815 S.E.2d at 73.
170. Id. at 769, 815 S.E.2d at 76.
171. Id. at 765, 815 S.E.2d at 73.
172. Id. at 770–73, 815 S.E.2d at 77–79.
173. Id. at 779, 815 S.E.2d at 82.
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not raise the issue or brief it.174 Justice Hunstein concurred specially
and would have concluded that the recusal motion need not have been
addressed by the trial court because it was not “presented” to the court
in addition to being filed with the clerk. 175
In In re Anderson, the supreme court imposed a public reprimand on
a magistrate judge with the judge’s consent.176 A woman had her car
repossessed by the owner of a car dealership for failure to make
payments that were due and for failure to have insurance on the car.
Judge Anderson called the owner of the dealership and demanded that
he either return the vehicle to the woman or reimburse her for what she
had paid to the dealership and to her insurance company related to the
car. When the owner refused, Judge Anderson told the woman to file a
case against the owner of the dealership in his court, and she did so.177
Judge Anderson also did not properly supervise the associate
magistrate judge to whom that case was assigned. 178 Judge Anderson
agreed to a public reprimand because these acts violated numerous
provisions of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct.179 The supreme
court of Georgia agreed and ordered the public reprimand. 180
The court of appeals faced a question about the limits of inherent
judicial authority in Csehy v. State.181 A trial judge was about to begin a
criminal trial but observed that defense counsel was behaving oddly,
was sweating profusely, and had bloodshot eyes. 182 After a bench
conference with the defendant and defense counsel, during which the
defendant reaffirmed that he wanted his lawyer to represent him, the
trial judge ordered the lawyer to take a drug test.183 The judge later
testified that she ordered the drug test because “[she has] a duty as a
judge, a sworn duty as a judge, to preserve the integrity of [her]
courtroom and to make sure the defendant [is] adequately defended.” 184
Several hours later, the defense counsel announced ready for trial, but
the trial judge noted that the lawyer’s urine tested positive for cocaine
and methamphetamine. The judge held the lawyer in contempt. 185 The
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 769–70, 815 S.E.2d at 76.
Id. at 780–86, 815 S.E.2d at 83–87 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
In re Anderson, 304 Ga. at 165, 816 S.E.2d at 677.
Id.
Id. at 167, 816 S.E.2d at 678.
Id. at 165–67, 816 S.E.2d at 677–78.
Id. at 168, 816 S.E.2d at 678–79.
346 Ga. App. 747, 816 S.E.2d 833.
Id. at 748, 816 S.E.2d at 836.
Id.
Id. at 750, 816 S.E.2d at 837.
Id. at 748–49, 816 S.E.2d at 836–37.
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next day, based upon these events, the district attorney obtained a
search warrant to draw blood from the attorney, and on the basis of
that search the lawyer was charged with drug possession. After he was
convicted, the lawyer appealed the denial of his motion to suppress,
arguing that the blood test (and later blood tests that were required as
a condition of his release on bond) resulted from the urine test, which
was an illegal warrantless search.186 The court of appeals rejected the
argument that the trial judge had the inherent or statutory power to
order a warrantless drug test of an apparently impaired attorney and
thus found the urine test to have been unlawful. 187 The court
nevertheless upheld the convictions on the basis that there was
probable cause for the blood tests without taking the illegal urine test
into account.188
VI. MALPRACTICE
The court of appeals decided three legal malpractice cases during the
survey period.189
In Lalonde v. Taylor English Duma, LLP,190 the court of appeals
affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to a lawyer and his
law firm.191 Lalonde invented a portable continuous positive airway
pressure device (commonly known as a CPAP) to treat sleep apnea.
Lalonde contributed his invention (and the related intellectual property
rights) to a new entity known as Deshum Medical, LLC in exchange for
a one-third ownership interest in the entity. The other member of
Deshum Medical, LLC was an entity known as PBM, which agreed to
contribute $5 million for the development of the CPAP invention in
exchange for a two-thirds ownership stake. Lalonde hired the Taylor
English Duma firm to represent him in connection with the drafting
and negotiation of the operating agreement for Deshum Medical,
LLC.192 PBM had separate counsel to represent its interests in that
process.193
186. Id. at 749–50, 816 S.E.2d at 837.
187. Id. at 754, 816 S.E.2d at 840.
188. Id. at 754–58, 816 S.E.2d at 840–43.
189. See Lalonde v. Taylor English Duma, LLP, 349 Ga. App. 853, 825 S.E.2d 237
(2019); McNeill v. SD & D Greenbuilt, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 140, 825 S.E.2d 521 (2019);
Stewart v. McDonald, 347 Ga. App. 40, 815 S.E.2d 665 (2018).
190. 349 Ga. App. 853, 825 S.E.2d 237 (2019). Judge Hodges concurred only in the
judgment and Judge Brown dissented in part. Therefore, the opinion is physical precedent
only. Id. at 863, 825 S.E.2d at 245 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 853, 825 S.E.2d at 238–39 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 853–54, 825 S.E.2d at 239.
193. Id. at 862, 825 S.E.2d at 244.
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The final operating agreement to which the parties agreed included a
provision that enabled PBM to dissolve Deshum Medical, LLC without
Lalonde’s permission. PBM eventually exercised this right and
dissolved Deshum Medical, LLC over Lalonde’s objection, and Deshum
Medical, LLC’s assets, including Lalonde’s invention, were transferred
to a new entity controlled by PBM and a related entity. Lalonde claimed
that his lawyers committed malpractice by drafting an operating
agreement that gave PPM this power.194 When Lalonde’s lawyers
sought summary judgment, the trial court did not find, one way or the
other, whether the lawyers breached the standard of care; rather, the
court granted summary judgment to the lawyers because Lalonde
would not be able to prove that the lawyers’ malpractice, if any, caused
him any damage.195
One way in which a client can attempt to prove damages from a
lawyer’s malpractice in the context of a transaction is by showing that,
but for the lawyer’s malpractice, the client would have obtained a better
deal. In Lalonde’s case, this would mean that, if his lawyers had not
breached the standard of care, he would have been able to sign an
operating agreement for Deshum Medical, LLC that protected him from
dissolution of the LLC without his permission. 196 The court of appeals
rejected this argument because Lalonde provided no evidence that PBM
ever would have signed an operating agreement that did not give it the
right to dissolve Deshum Medical, LLC without Lalonde’s agreement. 197
Another way for a client to prove damages from a lawyer’s
malpractice in a transaction is to prove that the client would not have
entered into the transaction at all if the lawyer had not breached the
standard of care and that the client would have been better off as a
result.198 Lalonde testified that, if his lawyers had alerted him to the
dangers associated with the dissolution provisions of the Deshum
Medical, LLC operating agreement, he would not have become a
member of the LLC, would have retained control over his device, and
would have pursued another opportunity. Judge Brown, in dissent,
argued that Lalonde had presented sufficient evidence to create a fact
issue with respect to the “no deal” theory of causation. 199

194. Id. at 854–55, 825 S.E.2d at 239–40.
195. Id. at 855–56, 825 S.E.2d at 240.
196. Id. at 861–62, 825 S.E.2d at 244.
197. Id. at 862–63, 825 S.E.2d at 244–45.
198. Id. at 864, 825 S.E.2d at 246 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
199. Id. at 863 n.11, 864–65, 825 S.E.2d at 245 n.11, 245–46 (Brown, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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The majority concluded instead that Lalonde had “severed the
proximate causation between his claimed damages and any negligence
on the part of his lawyers . . . .”200 This “severance” of causation arose,
according to the majority, from the following sequence of events. 201 In
the midst of PBM’s attempts to dissolve Deshum Medical, LLC, Lalonde
sued PBM and Deshum Medical, LLC in Delaware to force a judicial
dissolution rather than the dissolution that PBM was attempting to
effect on its own.202 Presumably, success in the Delaware suit would
have enabled Lalonde to retrieve or be compensated for his invention, in
which case his lawyers’ failures to protect his ownership rights in the
Deshum Medical, LLC operating agreement would not have harmed
him. However, rather than prosecute the Delaware case to judgment,
Lalonde settled the case and received $310,000 in exchange for a
release and an unrestricted license to his invention. 203 The court of
appeals concluded that the settlement severed any chance of showing
proximate cause between the alleged malpractice and the harm to
Lalonde because, after all, “[i]f Lalonde had chosen to litigate, rather
than to settle, and if he had won,” then indisputably his lawyers’
alleged malpractice would not have harmed him. 204
The court of appeals analogized Lalonde’s situation to one in which a
lawyer commits malpractice in connection with a lawsuit rather than a
transaction. If a lawyer commits malpractice in a litigated matter, but
the client might nevertheless prevail and negate any harm from the
malpractice, the client may not settle the case without severing
proximate cause between the lawyer’s malpractice and the outcome. 205
Because the claim might have terminated favorably to the client absent
the settlement, the client who settles waives any claim that the lawyer’s
malpractice caused any damage.206 In Lalonde’s case, the court
concluded, he waived any right to recover for his lawyers’ alleged
malpractice when he settled the Delaware case that might have negated
any harm his lawyers otherwise may have caused him. 207
200. Id. at 857, 825 S.E.2d at 241 (majority opinion).
201. Id. at 855–60, 825 S.E.2d at 240–43.
202. Id. at 856, 825 S.E.2d at 240–41.
203. Id. at 857, 825 S.E.2d at 241.
204. Id. at 860, 825 S.E.2d at 243.
205. Id. at 857, 825 S.E.2d at 241.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 860, 825 S.E.2d at 243. The court of appeals also declined to allow Lalonde
to proceed with a claim to recover the $58,000 in legal fees that he paid his lawyers in
connection with the operating agreement. It is worth noting that Lalonde may have had a
valid claim for forfeiture of those fees as a remedy for his lawyers’ breaches of fiduciary
duty to him, even if he could not prove actual damages that resulted from the lawyers’
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In McNeill v. SD & D Greenbuilt, LLC,208 the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment to a lawyer and a
law firm in a legal malpractice case. 209 The plaintiff lost $150,000 in
earnest money in connection with a real estate transaction. 210 The
Purchase and Sale Agreement set forth two dates by which the plaintiff
could have required return of the earnest money. One date permitted
the plaintiff to obtain a refund for any reason. The second allowed the
plaintiff to obtain a refund only under specific conditions relating to
environmental testing of the land being sold.211 The plaintiff demanded
a refund after the first date and before the expiration of the second
date, but for reasons unrelated to the environmental testing. The seller
refused to refund the earnest money.212
The plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against its lawyers and
claimed that the lawyers had led it to believe that the deadline for
obtaining a refund for any reason had been extended beyond the date
listed in the written contract.213 The lawyers defended on the basis of
Berman v. Rubin.214 That case stands for the proposition that generally
a client may not recover for professional negligence based upon
counsel’s misrepresentation of the meaning of a document that a
well-educated client, who has no disability, reads, if the meaning of the
document is plain, obvious, and requires no legal explanation. 215 The
court of appeals agreed with the trial court, however, that Berman did
not apply to his case because the alleged negligence was not about the
draftsmanship of the contract itself but rather concerned statements
that the lawyer made after the contract was executed about the “legal
effect” of potential changes to its terms—in particular an extension of
the right to terminate the contract and require return of the earnest
money.216 The court concluded that there was a jury question whether
the client was entitled to rely on their communications with the lawyer

conduct. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (AM. LAW INST.
2000). See also Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 237–40 (Tex. 1999) (holding clients need
not prove any actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an attorney’s fee for breach
of duty to the client).
208. 349 Ga. App. 140, 825 S.E.2d 521 (2019).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 142, 825 S.E.2d at 522.
212. Id. at 144, 825 S.E.2d at 523.
213. Id.
214. 138 Ga. App. 849, 227 S.E.2d 802 (1976).
215. Id. at 855, 227 S.E.2d at 806.
216. McNeill, 349 Ga. App. at 146, 825 S.E.2d at 524.
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“after the signing of the contract, as opposed to the language contained
therein.”217
In Stewart v. McDonald,218 a jury returned a verdict that an attorney
was liable to his former client for $392,000 as a result of malpractice in
connection with a business transaction. 219 The trial court entered
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defense. 220 The court of
appeals reversed that judgment and determined that the plaintiff had
introduced sufficient evidence of an implied attorney–client relationship
because there was enough evidence of a reasonable belief by the
plaintiff that the attorney was representing the plaintiff. 221 The lawyer
had helped the would-be client try to obtain equity in the transaction
and helped negotiate the would-be client’s employment contract.222 The
court of appeals further held that there was sufficient evidence of a
breach of duty because the attorney admitted that he did not look out
for the plaintiff’s interests (under the mistaken belief that they did not
have an attorney–client relationship).223 The court of appeals also held
that there was enough evidence of damages because there was evidence
that the plaintiff could have obtained a better deal in the underlying
transaction.224 Judge Ellington dissented on the basis that the proof of
damages—that the plaintiff could have obtained a better deal with the
lawyer’s help—was too speculative.225
VII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
The Georgia Court of Appeals decided seven miscellaneous legal
ethics cases during the survey period.226

217. Id. at 147, 825 S.E.2d at 525.
218. 347 Ga. App. 40, 815 S.E.2d 665 (2018).
219. Id. at 40–41, 815 S.E.2d at 667.
220. Id. at 41, 815 S.E.2d at 667.
221. Id. at 47–48, 815 S.E.2d at 671–72. Judge Ray concurred only in the judgment
and Judge Ellington dissented in part. Therefore, the opinion is physical precedent only.
Id. at 52, 815 S.E.2d 674 (Ellington, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
222. Id. at 46–47, 815 S.E.2d at 671 (majority opinion).
223. Id. at 49, 815 S.E.2d at 672–73.
224. Id. at 50, 815 S.E.2d at 673.
225. Id. at 52–55, 815 S.E.2d at 674–76 (Ellington, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
226. See Phillips v. Adams, Jordan & Herrington, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 184, 828 S.E.2d
414 (2019); Summerville v. Innovative Images, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 592, 826 S.E.2d 391
(2019); Hillman v. ALDI, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 432, 825 S.E.2d 870 (2019); Lynch v. State,
347 Ga. App. 260, 819 S.E.2d 54 (2018); Edward N. Davis, P.C. v Watson, 346 Ga. App.
729, 814 S.E.2d 826 (2018); Coen v. Aptean, Inc., 346 Ga. App. 815, 816 S.E.2d 64 (2018);
McClendon v. State, 347 Ga. App. 542, 820 S.E.2d 167 (2018).
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In Phillips v. Adams, Jordan & Herrington, P.C.,227 the court of
appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s decision to
grant summary judgment to a law firm on a former associate’s claim for
compensation.228 The associate worked for the firm initially under the
terms of a letter agreement that provided that he would be
compensated for his work on medical malpractice cases “upon successful
resolution” of a case by payment of a “portion of the fee,” “on a case by
case basis,” based upon “the extent” of his work.229 Approximately one
year later, the firm began paying the associate a set amount each
month, which the associate claimed merely advanced fees to be earned
upon completion of medical malpractice cases he worked on but which
the firm claimed was a salary that it paid under an agreement that
superseded the original letter agreement.230 When several medical
malpractice cases that the associate had worked on settled, he
demanded to be paid under the letter agreement and then resigned
when he was not satisfied with the firm’s response. The associate sued
the firm and sought compensation under the letter agreement and
under the doctrine of quantum meruit. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the firm because it concluded that the letter agreement
was too indefinite to be enforced and that the associate was not entitled
to quantum meruit compensation, because the parties had a written
contract.231
The court of appeals affirmed with respect to the contract claim. 232
The letter agreement did not contain sufficient specificity to make it
possible to calculate the associate’s compensation for any particular
case. For example, there was no agreement as to the “portion of the fee”
he would receive, nor was there any agreement about how to measure
“the extent” of the associate’s involvement. The law firm retained
discretion to calculate the compensation “on a case by case basis.” 233
The court of appeals reversed with respect to the quantum meruit
claim.234 The court noted that there was evidence that the associate
provided valuable services on the medical malpractice cases and that,
when a contract is found to be void for vagueness (as the letter

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

350 Ga. App. 184, 828 S.E.2d 414 (2019).
Id. at 184, 828 S.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 187, 828 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 185–86, 828 S.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 186, 828 S.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 187, 828 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 188, 828 S.E.2d at 417.
Id. at 188, 828 S.E.2d at 417–18.
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agreement was found to be), a claim for quantum meruit is
appropriate.235 The court remanded the case for further proceedings.236
The court of appeals enforced an arbitration clause in a lawyer’s fee
agreement with a client in Summerville v. Innovative Images, LLC.237
When a former client sued a law firm for legal malpractice, the firm
sought to enforce the fee agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause, but
the trial court refused to enforce that provision because it was
unconscionable.238 The trial court’s reasoning was that Georgia Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.4(b),239 which is identical to Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.4(b),240 requires lawyers to explain matters to
their clients “to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.” 241 Model
Rule 1.4 had been interpreted by the American Bar Association to
require lawyers who include arbitration clauses in their fee contracts to
explain the advantages and disadvantages of such clauses. 242 Because
there was no evidence that the lawyers had given these explanations,
the trial court held the clause to be unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.243 On interlocutory review, the court of appeals reversed
the trial court and enforced the arbitration clause. 244 The court applied
the general contract law doctrine of unconscionability and found that
this fee contract was not unconscionable.245 The court also noted that
the Georgia Arbitration Code expressed a strong policy preference for
arbitration and declined to engraft on its provisions the requirement
that lawyers make the disclosures required by the American Bar
Association’s interpretation of Model Rule 1.4(b), particularly when the
Georgia Supreme Court has not decided whether Georgia Rule 1.4(b)
requires those disclosures.246
In Hillman v. ALDI, Inc.,247 the court of appeals vacated and
remanded for reconsideration a trial court’s summary finding that a
lawyer was in criminal contempt of court for statements the lawyer
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id. at 188, 828 S.E.2d at 418.
349 Ga. App. 592, 826 S.E.2d 391 (2019).
Id. at 592, 826 S.E.2d at 394.
GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (2019).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
Summerville, 349 Ga. App. at 594 n.2, 826 S.E.2d 395 n.2.
Id. at 594 n.3, 826 S.E.2d at 395 n.3.
Id. at 594–95, 826 S.E.2d at 395.
Id.
Id. at 595–96, 826 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 598, 826 S.E.2d at 397.
349 Ga. App. 432, 825 S.E.2d 870 (2019).
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made during closing argument.248 The lawyer had been warned not to
refer in closing argument to any allegations that the defendant had
destroyed evidence.249 The lawyer nevertheless argued, and displayed a
PowerPoint slide to the jury that said, that the defendant “had a
videotape that they would have . . . preserved had it shown that [the
defendant] was not at fault.”250 The court of appeals vacated the
contempt order because the trial judge had not made the necessary
findings that the lawyer’s conduct “interfered with or posed a threat” to
the administration of justice and that the lawyer “was on notice that his
comments ‘exceeded the outermost bounds of permissible advocacy.’” 251
The trial court also had not applied the correct standard—proof beyond
a reasonable doubt—but instead had ruled that the court “was not
required to apply ‘any evidentiary standard of proof.’” 252
In Lynch v. State,253 the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea.254 The
defendant accepted the plea offer after the defendant sought
unsuccessfully to fire his retained counsel and after defendant’s counsel
recited at length in open court all the reasons why the defendant should
plead guilty.255 The court of appeals held that denial of the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea resulted in manifest injustice because the
defendant accepted the plea only after the trial court’s improper
handling of the defendant’s motion to fire his own retained counsel. 256
The trial court had declined to allow the defendant to fire his counsel
because the trial court found that the lawyer was providing effective
assistance, but that is the standard only for discharging appointed
counsel and not retained counsel.257 The trial court also failed to engage
in an appropriate balancing of the right to fire counsel and the need for
orderly administration of the courts because the court did not explain to
the defendant that he had choices to proceed with retained counsel, to
proceed with new counsel without delay, or to represent himself. 258

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 444–46, 825 S.E.2d at 880–81.
Id. at 438–39, 825 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 439, 825 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 445, 825 S.E.2d at 881.
Id.
347 Ga. App. 260, 819 S.E.2d 54 (2018).
Id. at 261, 819 S.E.2d at 56.
Id. at 260–62, 819 S.E.2d at 55–56.
Id. at 265, 819 S.E.2d at 58.
Id. at 264–65, 819 S.E.2d at 58.
Id. at 264, 819 S.E.2d at 58.
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In Edward N. Davis, P.C. v Watson,259 an attorney claimed an
attorney’s lien on real property that was recovered for a client as a
result of the lawyer’s legal services. 260 The lawyer did not, however,
record the lien, and the court of appeals held that the attorney’s lien
was subordinate to parties who became creditors of the client and
perfected their liens after the attorney had recovered the property. 261
In Coen v. Aptean, Inc.,262 the plaintiff had been a party to an earlier
case against his former employer in which the trial court had found that
the employer and its law firm had engaged in bad faith tactics. 263 The
plaintiff then sued the employer, the employer’s law firm, and two of
the employer’s lawyers under the abusive litigation statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-7-80,264 and sought general damages for mental distress and
punitive damages.265 The trial court held that the plaintiff’s claim could
not survive unless he pled special damages and that punitive damages
were not available for statutory abusive litigation claims, and the trial
court therefore dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 266 The court of appeals
reversed in part and held that, although the plaintiff could not recover
punitive damages, he could recover general damages in a statutory
claim for abusive litigation.267
The court of appeals dealt with the issue of a prosecutor’s duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense in McClendon v. State.268
Two defendants were convicted of criminal street gang activity, based in
part upon the testimony of Taliah Knox. 269 Unbeknownst to the defense,
Ms. Knox was a paid informant for the Atlanta Police Department and
received financial assistance from the district attorney’s office during
the trial. The prosecution did not disclose this impeachment evidence to
the defense, and the court of appeals held that their failure to do so
violated the prosecution’s disclosure obligations because the evidence
259. 346 Ga. App. 729, 814 S.E.2d 826 (2018).
260. Id. at 730, 814 S.E.2d at 828.
261. Id. at 730–33, 814 S.E.2d 827–29.
262. 346 Ga. App. 815, 816 S.E.2d 64 (2018).
263. Id. at 816, 816 S.E.2d at 68.
264. O.C.G.A. § 51-7-80 (2019).
265. Id. at 815, 816 S.E.2d at 67.
266. Id. On April 1, 2019, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to
address this issue: “Does the language ‘all damages allowed by law’ in O.C.G.A. § 51-7-83
(a) authorize an award of punitive damages in a statutory claim for abusive litigation?”
(order available at https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/s18c1638.pdf).
267. Id. at 819–24, 816 S.E.2d at 70–73.
268. 347 Ga. App. 542, 820 S.E.2d 167 (2018).
269. Id. at 543, 820 S.E.2d at 170.
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was material and therefore its unavailability to the defense undermined
confidence in the outcome of the trial. 270 Accordingly, the court of
appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the cases for new
trials.271
VIII. FORMAL ADVISORY OPINIONS272
The formal advisory opinion board received one request for an
opinion during the survey year.273 The request had two parts. The first
was for an opinion regarding whether the confidentiality requirements
of Rule 1.6 apply to unsolicited comments made to a lawyer by a
potential client with whom there is no pre-existing relationship.274 The
board determined that no Georgia rule of professional conduct answers
this question, although Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.18 275 and
ABA Formal Advisory Opinion 10-457276 (which interprets Model
Rule 1.18) do.277 The board referred the issue to the disciplinary rules
and procedures committee for consideration whether the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct should be amended to add a version of Model
Rule 1.18.278 The committee adopted a proposed rule based largely upon
Model Rule 1.18, and the Georgia Supreme Court was considering at
the close of the survey period whether to adopt the proposed rule. 279
The second part of the request asked whether a lawyer could reveal
communications from a potential client if those communications
indicated that the potential client may be engaged in ongoing
inappropriate behavior if revealing the communication could prevent
death or serious bodily injury.280 The board declined to address this part
of the request because the board determined that the existing rules of
conduct adequately answer the question. 281
270. Id. at 544, 820 S.E.2d at 170.
271. Id. at 549, 555, 820 S.E.2d at 173, 177.
272. The Author is a member of the State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinion
Board. This discussion is the Author’s alone and does not reflect any opinion or policy of
the Board or any of its members.
273. See Jeffrey Hobart Schneider, Formal Advisory Opinion Board, 2019 REP. OF THE
OFF.
OF
GEN.
COUNS.
OF
THE
ST.
B.
OF
GA.
at
11.
(https://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/19_OGC_Report.pdf).
274. Id.
275. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.18 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
276. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457 (2010).
277. Schneider, supra note 273, at 11.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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The formal advisory opinion board also considered during the survey
period whether to revise or withdraw Formal Advisory Opinion 87-6282
regarding the circumstances under which a lawyer may communicate
directly with a represented entity about a matter. 283 Since that opinion
was issued, the supreme court adopted the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct.284 The board determined that Georgia Rule 4.2285
answers the question posed by the opinion and that the opinion no
longer accurately reflects Georgia law.286 Accordingly, the board asked
the supreme court to withdraw the opinion, and it did so. 287
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article surveys recent developments in Georgia legal ethics
through May 31, 2019. For updates on developments after that date,
you may visit the web site of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism.288

282. Ga. Formal Advisory Op. Bd., Formal Op. 87-6 (1987).
283. Schneider, supra note 273, at 11.
284. Id.
285. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (2019).
286. Schneider, supra note 273, at 11.
287. Id. at 11–12.
288. As a service to the Georgia bench and bar, the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and
Professionalism provides monthly updates and other resources on recent developments in
Georgia legal ethics. Visit http://law.mercer.edu/academics/centers/clep/updates-legalethics/.

